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"DEFERENCE" VERSUS "SECURITY OF TENURE": EVICTION OF
RESIDENTS OF SUBSIDIZED HOUSING CO-OPERATIVES AT THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE FOR ONTARIO, 1992-2009
JEFF SCHLEMMER*
RgSUMik
Les residents ontariens de logements subventionn~s par le gouvernement b~n~ficient
de diff~rents niveaux de protection contre lexpulsion arbitraire selon qu'on leur a
offert un logement dans une cooperative de logement ou dans un autre type de loge-
ment subventionn6. Cependant, les lois prot~geant le droit au maintien des lieux dans
ces deux types de logement sont 6crites de faqon trs similaire. La difference provient
de la jurisprudence qui a 6volu&e au cours de la derni&e d~cennie, depuis que toutes
les expulsions de la location r~sidentielle, a lexception des cooperatives de logement,
ont &6 enlev~es de la juridiction des tribunaux judiciaires. Les juges entendaient
couramment des causes d'expulsion par analogie a des procs sommaires devant les
Cours des petites cr~ances; mais, a present, ils entendent des causes d'expulsion peu
fr~quemment et ont oubli6 la procedure des o petites cr~ances >. Ces residents ont des
revenus tr~s bas et ne peuvent observer les exigences des cours quant aux m~moires,
affidavits dtaills, et d~pens d'indemnisation partielle. Les cours suivent de plus en
plus un courant jurisprudentiel qui en d~fere aux cooperatives requ~rantes, en se
fondant sur la th~orie que les cooperatives fonctionnent comme des << d~mocraties
et en pr~sumant, sans fondement, que par le fait m~me d'accepter un logement sub-
ventionn6 dans une cooperative de logement, les residents perdent volontairement le
droit l6gislatif au maintien, qui protege tous les autres types de locataires.
Ce domaine de la loi est devenu insoutenable. La cour devrait se souvenir des raisons
pour lesquelles elle a trait6 ces cas d'expulsions diffdremment et effectuer un retour
a ses anciennes pratiques - qui procuraient des proc6s justes et accessibles aux plus
d~munis des Ontariens que servent les tribunaux judiciaires.
INTRODUCTION
Low-income Ontarians who apply for government-subsidized housing generally
wait on a list for years before being offered subsidized housing. When a subsidized
unit is offered, applicants usually feel compelled to take it-regardless of whether
it happens to be in rental housing owned by a non-profit housing corporation [a
non-profit] that is governed by the Residential Tenancies Act [RTA],1 which regulates
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most other residential tenancies in Ontario, or in housing owned by a co-operative
housing corporation [co-op] that is exempt from the RTA and under Ontario law is
governed by the Co-operative Corporations Act [CCA],2 which is a completely separ-
ate legislative scheme.
3
Residents of government-subsidized rental housing experience two very different
standards of risk of exposure to arbitrary eviction, depending upon whether they
happen to reside in a co-op or in another type of subsidized housing. Residents
of non-profits enjoy extensive protection from unfair eviction, as provided by the
RTA and administered by a rental housing tribunal, the Landlord and Tenant Board
[LTB]. Under the RTA, the tribunal offers no deference to the will of the landlord.
By contrast, even though the RTA and the CCA are worded very similarly, courts
have increasingly over the past decade paid deference to the will of co-op boards
and significantly emasculated the provisions of the CCA that protect co-op residents
from arbitrary eviction. There is little statutory basis for this dramatic distinction in
security of tenure since the applicable sections of the CCA and the RTA that govern
evictions are similar in language.
4
Some courts have characterized co-ops as "participatory democracies', owed great
deference in eviction decisions. 5 Their rationale is that eviction from a housing co-
op proceeds from a democratic vote of the other residents of the housing complex
or its democratically elected board of directors. Presumably this democracy provides
protection analogous and equivalent to what courts provide to the residents of the
other types of subsidized housing. When a co-op applies for an eviction order, courts
tend to defer to the will of the majority and do not necessarily require the co-op to
fully prove its case for eviction in the same way that would be required of any other
housing provider. This deferential approach stands in stark contrast to the historical
tario, for access to his comprehensive research memoranda on co-operative housing law in Ontario,
from which much of the analysis contained in this paper is drawn.
1. Residential Tenancies Act, S.O. 2006, c. 17.
2. Co-operative Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.35, as amended.
3. Federal housing co-ops incorporated under the Canada Cooperatives Act, s.c. 1998, c. 1, have a cor-
porate structure different from that of provincial housing co-ops incorporated under the CCA, ibid.
However, differences in corporate structure do not affect the issues of eviction under consideration in
this article.
4. Compare, for example, s. 171.21 (1) of the CCA, ibid., which states that upon an application by a co-op
for eviction "a judge may, despite any other provision of this Act or the co-operative's by-laws, (a) refuse
to grant the application if he or she is satisfied, having regard to all the circumstances, that it would be
unfair to grant it, with s. 83(1) of the RTA, supra note i, which states that upon an application for evic-
tion of a tenant, "the Board may, despite any other provision of this Act or the tenancy agreement, (a)
refuse to grant the application unless satisfied, having regard to all the circumstances, that it would be
unfair to refuse"'
5. See, for example, Tamil Co-operative Homes Inc. v. Arulappah [ 1996] O.J. No. 768; 61 A.C.W.S. (3d) 811,
Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.), Moloy J. para. 61; and, recently, Alexandra Park Co-operative v. Hamilton [2009]
O.J. No. 2768, Code, J.
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role that the courts have played in preventing the arbitrary termination of other gov-
ernment-funded social services and that housing tribunals have played in protecting
residents of most other rental housing from unfair eviction since taking over this role
from the courts in 1998.6
When co-operative democracies work fairly, they do not need deference. They are
fully able to prove their case, because they come to the court in good faith and with
admissible evidence justifying eviction. But democracies are not always fair, and
courts should not always defer to the majority co-op rule. When the less generous
instincts of human nature take hold, a majority will not be fair to an individual,
and that is precisely why laws protect the rights of an individual from the will of
the majority. The protection of individual rights is, for example, one the most im-
portant reasons for the enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
7
President James Madison, one of the drafters of the Constitution of the United States
of America, identified the problem in this way: 'A pure democracy can admit no cure
for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will be felt by a majority,
and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party."
8
The Ontario legislature modelled the CCA, which is intended to protect security of
tenure for co-op residents, on other laws that protect tenants of most other rental
housing in Ontario. It intended the courts to act as a check where they find a "com-
mon passion" to sacrifice the tenancy interests of a particular resident. The legislature
intended the courts to do this by requiring the co-op to prove with admissible evi-
dence that it has lawful grounds to evict a co-op resident-just as any other housing
provider would have to do. If the court does not take on this responsibility, there is a
substantial risk that the rights of an individual co-op resident will not be respected.
A growing line of case law suggests that courts should generally not intervene to pro-
tect co-op residents against arbitrary eviction, except by requiring that minimal stan-
dards of procedural fairness and compliance with the co-op's procedural by-laws be
met.9 This type of deference arises most frequently where the credibility of evidence
is in issue, or where the law requires the exercise of discretion based upon "fairness".
Courts tend to accept findings of credibility made by co-op boards comprising lay-
persons equipped with none of the expertise or tools, such as cross-examination, that
are employed by courts to discover the truth and ensure a fair result. Co-op residents,
6. Re: social services see Abrahams v. Canada (Attorney General), [1983] 1 S.C.R. 2; re: removal of resi-
dential evictions to housing tribunal, see Tenant Protection Act, 1997, S. 0. 1997 c. 24; TPA-which
replaced the Landlord and Tenant Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 236 Part IV, and gave exclusive jurisdiction to the
ORHT to deal with most residential tenancy evictions.
7. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11.
8. Federalist No. 10, 1787, in Kenneth T. Jackson, ed., The Encyclopedia of New York City (New York The
New York Historical Society, 1995) at 194.
9. See e.g. Arulappah, supra note v.
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once evicted, are then practically speaking barred for life from living in government-
subsidized housing.10
There is, however, another line of jurisprudence that has protected security of tenure
for co-op residents. 11 While decisions protecting security of tenure are increasingly
the exception, these cases more accurately reflect the legislative intent behind the
CCA-to provide a similar process and protection from unfair eviction to co-op resi-
dents as what exists for other residential tenants in Ontario.
A HISTORICAL SYNOPSIS OF HOUSING Co-op EVICTIONS
Background and Structure of Housing Co-ops
In Ontario a housing co-op is a form of subsidized rental housing that has unique
legal characteristics but from a consumer's point of view is entirely equivalent to and
interchangeable with all other forms of subsidized rental housing.
A housing co-op legally comprises a corporation established by the government.
12
The corporation owns a residential rental housing complex, generally comprising
family units almost exclusively. The government ultimately owns any equity in the
non-profit corporation' 3 but permits the residents (referred to as "members" in the
CCA) to manage the complex. 14 Residents are contractually entitled to occupy their
units pursuant to leases (called "occupancy agreements" in the CCA), which require
residents to obey the housing co-op's by-laws and pay rent (which the CCA refers to
as "housing charges").
Housing co-ops are regulated by and operate with the considerable financial support
of government. 15 A significant part of this support is in the form of subsidization of
10. Per Social Housing Reform Act ["SHRA"], S.O. 2000, c. 27, s. 7 (1) (i), (g) and (h).
11. Generally following the reasoning of the Divisional Court in Tamil Co-operative Homes Inc. v. Arulap-
pah, [1999] O.J. No. 1460; 44 O.R. (3d) 120; 122 O.A.C. 280; 25 R.P.R. (3d) 85; 87 A.C.WS. (3d) 1237,
(Div. Ct.), Rosenberg, Dunnet and Cumming JJ.
12. Federally incorporated co-operatives, unlike provincially incorporated co-operatives, are not governed
by the CCA or the SHRA. Both, however, rely upon CCA, s. 171, for applying to Ontario Superior
Courts for eviction orders, and the author was unable, in the roughly 170 reported cases reviewed for
this article, to find a case where the court found any significance in whether the applicant co-operative
was federally or provincially incorporated.
13. York (Municipality) v. Thornhill Green Co-operative Homes Inc. [2008] O.J. No. 3343; 169 A.C.WS. (3d)
407; 46 C.B.R. (5th) 237 (Sup. Ct.) Morawetz, J.; Labourview Co-operative Homes Inc. v. Chatham-Kent
(Municipality) [2007] O.J. No. 3166, (Div. Ct.) Lane, Jennings & Brockenshire, JJ.
14. Some deference cases, such as McBride v. Comfort Living Housing Co-op Inc. [ 1992] O.J. No. 260; 7 O.R.
(3d) 394; 89 D.L.R. (4th) 76; 54 O.A.C. 286; 22 R.P.R. (2d) 126; 31 A.C.WS. (3d) 663 (Ont. C.A.) Blair,
Finlayson and Arbour JJ.A., para. 49, mistakenly say that the residents share "co-operative ownership",
but residents have no ownership or equity interest in the co-operative corporation. Rarely, a resident
may not also be a member-in which case his or her rights are governed as a tenant by the RTA.
15. All descriptions of the operation of housing co-operatives attributable to interview with Louise Stevens,
director of housing for the Corporation of the City of London, 16 January 2008. The Ontario Ministry
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rents for rental units, which the co-op is then required to offer to persons of modest
financial means who become eligible for subsidized housing by reaching the top of
the local municipal subsidized housing waiting list. 16 The government reserves the
right to dismiss housing co-op boards of directors and take over management if the
board proves incapable of competently operating the co-op.' 7
Co-ops are only one of several types of subsidized non-profit housing established
and regulated by government. A second type is residential rental accommodation
owned by non-profit corporations, often sponsored by community groups, churches,
or labour organizations, and governed by volunteer boards of directors elected by
"members" (who may or may not also be residents).' 8 A third type is government-
owned rental housing non-profit corporations governed by volunteer boards of dir-
ectors appointed by the local municipality. 19
The most significant unique features of co-operatives are that (1) some residents do
not receive a housing subsidy-but rather pay "market rent", (2) most residents are
"members" and thus entitled to vote and to stand for the co-operative corporation's
board of directors, and (3) all member residents are required to volunteer time to
assist in the operation of the complex, typically by serving on committees for such
matters as maintenance, finance and membership.
Actual day-to-day management, however, is typically delegated to either a property-
management company or to an employee, often referred to as a "co-ordinator".
Housing co-ops are vehicles through which the government provides the social
service of low-cost housing by paying substantial subsidies directly to the co-ops.
In exchange for this subsidization, the co-ops agree to limit themselves to having
the same discretion in deciding whom they permit to rent their subsidized units as
of Housing delegates its powers to local municipal governments. Canada Mortgage and Housing Cor-
poration delegates its powers to the Co-operative Housing Program Administration Agency of Cana-
da. See Co-operative Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.35; SHRA, c. 27; National Housing Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. N-11; Canada Mortgage and Housing Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-7. See also Guide to Co-operative
Housing, online at <http://www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca/en/co/buho/gucoho/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/
security/getfile.cfm&PageID=27549>; Sylvia Novac, Analysis of Evictions in the City of Toronto Co-
operative Housing Sector (Toronto: Shelter, Housing and Support Division, Community and Neigh-
bourhood Services Department, City of Toronto, 2004).
16. SHRA, s. 68. In Toronto, for example, called "Housing Connections" In London called "Housing Ac-
cess Centre" In federal co-operatives, the subsidy list may be maintained, subject to federal oversight,
by the individual co-operative.
17. For example York (Municipality) v. Thornhill Green Co-operative Homes Inc., supra note 13; Los Andes
of Hamilton Coop Inc. v. Robles [1994] O.J. No. 799, Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.), Philp J.; and "Fraud Probed
at Co-op Complex" London Free Press (7 December 2007), re government takeover of two housing
co-operatives. (Presently 10% of London's housing co-operatives operate under boards installed by the
municipality, according to Louise Stevens, supra note 15.)
18. For example Interchurch Community Housing Toronto, Rotary Cheshire Homes North York, Lift
Non-Profit Housing of London Inc.
19. For example London & Middlesex Housing Corporation, Toronto Community Housing Corporation.
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that permitted other non-profit housing providers. 20 This is appropriate because the
government is not permitted to discriminate when it provides social services, even
where it subcontracts the provision of these services to a non-profit corporation.
The decision as to whether an Ontarian of modest means ends up living in subsidized
rental housing owned by the government, non-profit rental housing, or a non-profit
housing co-op depends largely upon which housing unit is vacant when the person
reaches the top of waiting lists, which are typically several years long. For example,
in regions where the Social Housing Reform Act 21 imposes municipal waiting lists
for subsidized housing, the list serves as a single point of contact. Applicants for
subsidized housing will ultimately be offered housing in whatever housing complex
is available when they reach the top of the list-including provincial co-ops.22 This
fact alone undermines the old view that co-ops are a form of social club that are en-
titled to deference in their decision-making process.23 In 2009, it would be a fiction
to suggest that everyone living in a provincially subsidized housing co-op has freely
and voluntarily consented to live there rather than in another type of subsidized
housing.
Grounds for Housing Co-op Evictions
Housing co-ops, like all other residential landlords, must be able to require their resi-
dents to comply with applicable laws, by threat of eviction proceedings if necessary.
Generally respondents in eviction proceedings enjoy the right to defend themselves
and to succeed if it is found that they did not break the law in a way that would
compromise their security of tenure. This principle has, however, been significantly
eroded in co-op eviction cases by the principle of "deference"-by which courts will
not require a co-op applying for eviction to prove, on balance of probabilities, that
the co-op resident has breached any law or by-law. Rather, the co-op need only show
that it reasonably thought the resident had broken a rule-regardless of whether the
resident had actually done so.24 The test of "reasonableness" that the courts have
applied is whether no reasonable person could have made the same decision.
25
20. Louise Stevens, supra note 15: The housing provider may consider financial history and previous rental
history. Thus, for example, the government would not permit the co-operatives board of directors to
permit friends and relatives to "jump the queue" and be offered a subsidized housing unit without
spending several years on the government's local subsidized housing waiting list, nor could it refuse to
house a family because it did not think that it would "fit in.
21. Supra note 10.
22. SHRA, s. 68. The SHRA does not apply to federal co-operatives-which maintain their own, generally
long, waiting fists.
23. McBride, supra note 14.
24. Tamil Co-operative Homes Inc. v. Arulappah [ 1996] O.J. No. 768; 61 A.C.WS. (3d) 811, Ont. Ct. (Gen.
Div.), Molloy J. at para. 43; Mimico Co-operative Homes Inc. v. Ward [1995] O.J. No. 2217; [1995] O.J.
No. 2216; 56 A.C.WS. (3d) 898, Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.), Ewaschuk J. at para. 18.
25. Tamil Co-operative Homes Inc. v. Arulappah, ibid.
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The principle of deference to the decision-making authority of co-op boards has af-
fected several other aspects of court applications for eviction of housing co-op resi-
dents. Some courts have begun to restrict eviction application hearings to affidavit
evidence-no longer permitting residents to call oral evidence in their defence or to
cross-examine their accusers. Courts have refused to hear defences to alleged arrears
where the reason for the "arrears" is the housing co-op's unlawful cancellation of the
resident's rent subsidy. Courts have awarded costs against residents who unsuccess-
fully defend eviction applications on a substantial-indemnity scale-making it pro-
hibitively expensive for a resident of modest means to defend himself or herself from
a wrongful eviction and creating a barrier to access to justice.
The Impetus for Law Reform
Pre-Law-Reform Co-op Housing Evictions
Prior to 1970, residential tenants living in rental housing in Ontario had virtually no
right, at common law, to retain that housing if the landlord decided to evict them.26
This was also the situation for housing co-op residents until 1992,27 when significant
amendments intended to protect the security of tenure of co-op residents were made
to the CCA. Before the 1992 CCA amendments were enacted, co-op residents effect-
ively occupied their homes at the landlord's pleasure. Most eviction orders, including
those for commercial and residential tenancies, and housing co-ops, were obtained
pursuant to Part III of the Landlord and Tenant Act 28 [LTA] -which did not gave a
substantive right of security of tenure in residential tenancies.
In 1968 the Law Reform Commission of Ontario [LRCO] released a report which
stated its concern
to redress the imbalance which existed in the law in favour of landlords, an imbalance
resulting from the law's preoccupation with the rigid property principles of feudal origin
and the failure of the common law of landlord and tenant over the centuries to develop a
legal philosophy based on a theory of vital interests.29
26. Residential Tenancies in Ontario, 1998, Fleming, J., Butterworths p. 3.
27. There was no consistency, but it was common practice to proceed under Part I-III of the LTA. Some co-
operative decisions under these sections were very good, but Part IV of the LTA was more specifically
crafted to protect the tenure rights of residential tenants.
28. Now Commercial Tenancies Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.7; Arauco Housing Corporation v. Baron [1991], To-
ronto Court File No. L14089/91 (Gen. Div.); aff'd (19 January 1993) Div. Ct. File No. 119/91 (Div. Ct.),
Callaghan, C.J.O.C., Lane & Adams JJ.; Chautauqua Co-operative Homes Inc. v. Wilson [1986] O.J.
No. 2048 (Ont. Dist. Ct.) DCOM No. 1119/86, Clarke D.C.J.; Don Area Coop Homes v. Lee [1979] O.J.
No. 4363; 26 O.R. (2d) 40; [1979] 2 A.C.WS. 457, (Ont. Co. Ct.) (Conant J.).
29. Supra note 26.
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The LRCO report was implemented in 1969 as Part IV of the LTA,3° which in respect
of residential tenancies has since been succeeded by the RTA.31 Security of tenure,
which is the right to occupy one's home free from the threat of arbitrary eviction,
has been the central right protected by the Ontario residential tenancy statutes since
then.
The Principle of Deference
McBride v. Comfort Living Housing Co-op Inc. (1992)
In 1992, the Court of Appeal released its decision in McBride v. Comfort Living
Housing Co-op Inc.32 and made a definitive statement of the common law respecting
co-op evictions. Justice Finlayson, for the Court, in obiter, articulated the "deference
theory":
The material before us reveals in detail the concept of collective ownership which is the
basis for the occupancy rights of members of this co-operative. The co-operative can be
likened to a social club, where membership is by application and acceptance in accordance
with criteria set out in the club's by-laws or regulations.
In the context of clubs, decisions to expel members must be made according to the rules set
out by the membership. The courts recognize the supremacy, in this setting, of these consen-
sual rules and will not interfere with a bona fide decision to terminate membership made in
accordance with them [emphasis added]. 3 3
Justice Finlayson ruled that the LTA did not apply to co-operative housing. In obiter,
he even went so far as to criticize the concept of security of tenure as protected in Part
IV of the LTA, referring to it as "a paternalistic statute"
3 4
McBride is generally cited as the leading case that established the theory that defer-
ence is owed to co-ops in eviction applications-just as the courts would defer to a
decision of a member-owned men's club that a particular member was no longer its
"sort of people" All later co-op "deference" cases build from this foundation, despite
30. R.S.O. 1970, c. 236, as amended.
31. "It is clear, therefore, that Part IV of the Act sets up a new regime for landlords and tenants in this Prov-
ince. Many of the old-even ancient-doctrines of feudal tenure have been swept away and replaced
by statutory rules more consistent with some of the more benevolent aspects of modern contract law.
Equally clear is the fact that, by virtue of the recent amendments in 1975, the Legislature sought to
achieve a more substantial measure of security of tenure for tenants than previously obtained. It is now
clear that no grounds exist for recovery of possession from a tenant during the currency of the lease,
save for non-payment of rent within s. 103 (e) [enacted 1975 (2nd Sess.), c. 13, s. 3] or the enumer-
ated causes within s. 103f and that the whole process is subject to Court supervision." London Housing
Authorityv. Appleton, [1978] O.J. No. 3229; 18 O.R. (2d) 345; 82 D.L.R. (3d) 559; 5 R.P.R. 324; [1978] 1
A.C.W.S. 228, (On. Cty. Ct.) Killeen J.
32. Supra note 14.
33. Ibid. para. 49.
34. Ibid. para. 17. McBride has been cited as current law as recently as St. Charles Co-operative Homes Inc.
v. Henney, [2008] O.J. No. 978; 165 A.C.WS. (3d) 940 (Sup. Ct.) Matheson J.
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subsequent legislative amendments that were quickly made to ameliorate the devas-
tating effect of this decision on security of tenure in housing co-ops.
Law Reform: 1992 CCA Amendments
In response to McBride, the Ontario government quickly enacted extensive amend-
ments to the CCA, closely modelled on Part IV of the LTA, 35 and thereby demon-
strated an intention to provide protection from arbitrary eviction to residents of co-
operatives similar to that enjoyed by those governed by Ontario's residential tenancy
legislation. Under these amendments, the CCA protects security of tenure by provid-
ing that a co-op resident may only be evicted (1) for contravening a co-op by-law, (2)
with an application made on proper notice, (3) on a ground for eviction set out in the
by-law, and (4) only if that ground is not arbitrary or unreasonable.
Even if the proper procedure was followed and reasonable grounds exist, the court
may still refuse to evict a co-op resident where, in all the circumstances, it would
be unfair to do so.3 6 The CCA amendments appeared to grant security of tenure to
co-op residents, provided they did not breach the co-op's by-laws.37 In particular, s.
171.8(2) of the amended CCA sets out a right to security of tenure such that
membership and occupancy rights may be terminated only if the member ceases to occupy
a member unit or on a ground set out in the by-laws. Membership and occupancy rights may
not be terminated on a ground in the by-laws that is unreasonable or arbitrary.
Furthermore, s. 171.21 of the amended CCA also protects security of tenure on a
discretionary basis, stating that
upon an application by a co-operative for writ of possession relating to a member unit, a
judge may, despite any provision of this act or the co-operative's by-laws ... refuse to grant
the application if he or she is satisfied, having regard to all the circumstances, that it would
be unfair to grant it. [Emphasis added.] 
38
If the legislature had intended to continue what had been declared to be the law in
McBride, it could have modelled the CCA amendments on Parts I-III rather than Part
IV of the LTA-which was crafted specifically to protect the right of security of tenure
for residential tenants. The 1992 amendments modelled on Part IV appeared to have
rejected the private "social club" theory and to have enshrined something more akin
to the security of tenure provided to other residential residents in Ontario. The CCA
amendments in s. 171 apparently addressed the concern that the "pure democracy" in
35. Bill 166 amending the Co-operative Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 35, s. 171; Tamil Co-operative
Homes Inc. v. Arulappah, supra note 11; 44 O.R. (3d) 120; 122 O.A.C. 280; 25 R.PR. (3d) 85; 87 A.C.WS.
(3d) 1237, (Div. Ct.), Rosenberg, Dunnet & Cumming ii., paras. 27-28.
36. S. 171.8 (2) 2 and s. 171.21(l)(a).
37. Tamil Co-operative Homes Inc. v. Arulappah, supra note 35, para. 11: "In my view the court has to de-
termine whether or not there was in fact a breach of the by-law."
38. CCA.
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co-ops was susceptible to the "mischiefs of faction" referred to by President Madison
and recognized that some sort of "check" was needed to protect the homes of individ-
ual residents. The CCA amendments mandated judicial oversight of housing co-op
eviction decisions, to ensure both procedural and substantive fairness.
39
When the legislative changes were first introduced in the legislature as Bill 166, the
Honourable Brian Charlton, then minister of finance, stated, "The bill also ensures
members receive similar protection as tenants in privately owned rental accommoda-
tions while preserving the distinctive character of co-ops and member control" [em-
phasis added] .40
These sections, virtually identical to the equivalent sections in Part IV of the LTA,
appear to be quite straightforward and clear on their face. On principles of statutory
interpretation,41 there would appear to be no reason to qualify or add to these words.
The CCA has not been amended in any material way since the 1992 amendments.
POST-LAW-REFORM HOUSING Co-op EVICTION JURISPRUDENCE
The Survival of the Principle of Deference
Since 1992, and particularly since 1998 when Ontario courts stopped hearing resi-
dential tenancy eviction applications, a line of jurisprudence has ignored the fact the
CCA was enacted to overcome the effect of the McBride decision. This jurisprudence,
which still defers to McBride, is based on the assumption that co-ops have remained
"participatory democracies" analogous to "social clubs" and that they operate on the
39. When residential tenancies were transferred from the jurisdiction of the courts in 1998, co-operatives
remained under judicial scrutiny.
40. Tamil Co-operative Homes Inc. v. Arulappah, supra note 35, para. 7.
41. "Departure from the ordinary, plain meaning of the word should only be resorted to in the face of an ab-
surdity or inconsistency that is apparent from the very language of the statute (Driedger, Construction
of Statutes (2d ed.) Toronto: Butterworths, 1983 at pp. 47-57).' Ontario (Regional Assessment Commis-
sioner Region No. 3) v. Graham [1993] O.J. No. 2443; 16 O.R. (3d) 83; 106 D.L.R. (4th) 577; 67 O.A.C.
362; 36 R.P.R. (2d) 13; 43 A.C.WS. (3d) 341 (C.A.), Tarnopolsky, Krever & Arbour JJ.A., p. 8:
(1) Principles of Statutory Interpretation:
In Elmer Driedger's definitive formulation, found at p. 87 of his Construction of Statutes (2nd ed.
1983):
Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their
entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the
Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.
"Driedger's modern approach has been repeatedly cited by this Court as the preferred approach to stat-
utory interpretation .Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex [2002] S.C.J. No. 43; [2002] A.C.S.
no. 43; 2002 SCC 42; 2002 CSC 42; [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559; [2002] 2 R.C.S. 559; 212 D.L.R. (4th) 1; 287
N.R. 248; [2002] 5 WW.R. 1; J.E. 2002-775; 166 B.C.A.C. 1; 100 B.C.L.R. (3d) 1; 18 C.P.R. (4th) 289; 93
C.R.R. (2d) 189; 113 A.C.WS. (3d) 52 (SCC), rHeureux-Dubk, lacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie,
Arbour & LeBel JJ., para. 26 (emphasis added).
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basis of "co-operative ownership. 42 Therefore, according to those courts, co-ops
should be given substantial deference in deciding whether to evict a resident.
Within four years of the amendments, several courts had ruled that the CCA amend-
ments were not intended to effect a substantive change in the law and that McBride
effectively remained the law of Ontario-namely that because co-ops were analogous
to private "social clubs" they were largely free to decide whom they wanted to keep
as members.43 The role of the courts, in co-op eviction cases, was limited to ensuring
that the "club's" procedural by-laws, and basic procedural fairness, has been hon-
oured when it removed a "member".
Tamil Co-operative Homes Inc. v. Arulappah
Arulappah: Trial Decision
This approach was articulated in the decision of Justice Molloy in Tamil Co-operative
Homes Inc. v. Arulappah,44 which subsequent courts have generally relied upon as
authority for the continuation of the "deference" theory. While Justice Molloy's rea-
soning was later rejected by the Divisional Court,45 the Divisional Court's decision
was then reversed by the Court of Appeal for reasons of jurisdiction for mootness.46
At trial, Justice Molloy held that:
while I do not consider myself bound to follow the reasoning in Comfort Living [McBride],
there is much in the logic of that reasoning which I find compelling, as more particularly
referred to below ... I was referred to only two cases dealing with the standard of review in
these situations since the legislative amendments.
47
In Mimico Co-operative Home Inc. v. Ward (unreported, 21 July 1995), Ewaschuk J.
held:
My duty is to ensure that the Board had a reasonable basis to arrive at their decision though
it is not my role to second guess the Board as to the correctness of the decision so long as I
am satisfied that they acted reasonably in the circumstances.
Similarly, in Woburn Village Co-operative Homes Inc. v. Kannundurai, Epstein J. stated
that she agreed with the approach taken by Ewaschuk J. and held:
42. McBride v. Comfort Living Housing Co-op Inc., supra note 32, paras. 20-21.
43. Tamil Co-operative Homes Inc. v. Arulappah, supra note 24; Woburn Village Co-operative Homes Inc. v.
Kannundurai [1995] O.J. No. 2485; 57 A.C.WS. (3d) 347, Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.), Epstein J.
44. Tamil Co-operative Homes Inc. v. Arulappah, ibid.
45. Supra note 35.
46. Tamil Co-operative Homes Inc. v. Arulappah [2000] O.J. No. 3372; 49 O.R. (3d) 566; 192 D.L.R. (4th)
177; 162 O.A.C. 356; 48 C.P.C. (4th) 15; 36 R.P.R. (3d) 58; 99 A.C.WS. (3d) 206, (Ont. C.A.), Labrosse,
Doherty & Austin JJ.A.
47. Supra note 5 at para. 56.
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The Court's duty in situations such as this is to ensure that the Board acted reasonably in
the circumstances.
48
It was argued before me that the decisions of Ewaschuk J. and Epstein J. are not binding on
me (which is true) and that the standard of review applied by them is simply stated without
any extensive supporting legal analysis (which, again, is true) ... I find myself in substantial
agreement with the views expressed by Ewaschuk J. and Epstein J. as well as with the obser-
vations made by Finlayson J.A. in Comfort Living [McBride].4
... The philosophy underlying co-operative housing would be completely undermined if
the decisions of co-operatives were treated in the same manner by the court as decisions of
private landlords. Some degree of deference to the democratically elected Board is required.
It is not appropriate, in my view, for the court to substitute its own opinion for that of the
co-operative or to second-guess what the co-operative has done.
50
Thus, the trial judge found that the substantial amendments to the CCA had resulted
in no substantive change in residents' security of tenure. The McBride decision, which
had been the impetus for remedial amendments to the CCA, then remained the law
of Ontario.
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Justice Molloy did not articulate what the philosophy underlying co-op housing
was, or why it would be completely undermined if co-ops could not evict residents
who have contravened no by-law. However, in Sequoia Co-operative Homes Inc. v.
Forsyth,52 Justice McKinnon characterized the philosophy of co-ops as "choosing as
a lifestyle to care and support one another" Under this deference theory, an eviction
application by a co-op will be granted by the court even if the resident had not, in
fact, contravened a by-law, so long as it was not unreasonable for the lay members of
the co-op board to have believed that the resident had done so. Importantly, this was
the outcome in both Arulappah and Mimico53 -where the courts found that grounds
did not in fact exist to evict the resident-but out of deference to the co-ops they
evicted them anyway.
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48. Ibid. at para. 57.
49. Ibid. at para. 58.
50. Ibid. at para 59.
51. Madame Justice Molloy's interpretation was accepted by the Divisional Court in David B. Archer Co-
operative Inc. v. D'Oliveira [2003] O.J. No. 1469 (Div. Ct.) A. Campbell, McNeely & E.M. Macdonald JJ.,
but rejected by another panel of the Divisional Court in Eagleson Co-operative Homes Inc. v. Thebarge
[2006] O.J. No. 4585 (Div. Ct.) Roy, Linhares de Sousa & R.J. Smith JJ.
52. [1999] File no. 99-CV-8896, Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.).
53. Supra, note xliii
54. Ibid. Arulappah para. 64: "[W]hile on the evidence before me I am satisfied that there was no profiteer-
ing, the evidence that was before the Board was quite different. In the circumstances, the Board had a
reasonable basis for its decision to terminate on this ground'
Mimico para. 18: "I doubt that I would have found that Mr. N'dem's conduct had reached the level of a
disturbance, given the need for a measure of tolerance on the part of the Co-op"
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The 2007 decision of John Bruce Village Co-operative v. Goulding 55 is typical of recent
cases that have upheld the principle of deference as articulated in Justice Molloy's
decision as settled law. There, the court held:
This court's jurisdiction on an application by a co-op under s. 117.13(1) of the Act is fairly
limited ... Judges will usually defer to an eviction decision made by a housing co-operative
because of its democratic and self-governing nature. The court should not interfere with the
eviction decision unless the decision was unreasonable or procedurally unfair ... The deci-
sion of the housing co-operative may be set aside as unreasonable only when "it is apparent
that the decision was so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have made it" ...
the case law has narrowed the scope and content of this provision and has limited the court's
discretion under s. 171.21 (1)(a) to cases of exceptional and extenuating circumstances.
The "deference" case law since Justice Molloy's decision has all applied similar
rationales.
Arulappah: Divisional Court
Under a second line of at least twenty cases, courts have preferred to follow the plain
words of the statute, which direct that the court may evict only if the resident has
contravened a by-law and may refuse to evict if in all of the circumstances it would be
unfair to evict.56 This approach is best summarized in the Divisional Court decision
in Arulappah where Justice Rosenberg held that:
Before the amendment the co-operative corporation board was in an entirely different pos-
ition. Section 66.1 of the CCA provided:
A member may be expelled from membership in a co-operative by resolution passed
by a majority of the board of directors at a meeting duly called for the purpose...
Section 171.8(1) eliminates this right to so expel a member, if the member had occupancy
rights. Under the old regime the decision was made by the board of directors since occu-
pancy rights depended on membership. Once the board had taken away the membership,
the court would issue a writ of possession if the member did not vacate. The court was
not making the decision. While it might review the decision of the board on the grounds
of reasonableness or even procedural fairness or compliance with the procedural by-laws
relating to termination, the decision had been made and the court while reviewing it was
not making the decision. As previously stated, under the new regime s. 171.13(2), the court
55. [2007] O.J. No. 1617; 59 R.PR. (4th) 173; 157 A.C.WS. (3d) 193; 2007 CarswellOnt 2570, (Sup. Ct.),
E.P. Belobaba J. paras. 9, 10, 12.
56. For example Eagleson Co-operative Homes, Inc. v. Thiberge [2006] O.J. No. 4585; 274 D.L.R. (4th) 359;
218 O.A.C. 321; 151 A.C.WS. (3d) 137, (Div. Ct.), A.J. Roy, M.T. Linhares de Sousa & R.J. Smith JJ.;
Agincourt Co-operative Homes Inc. v. Edwards [2006] O.. No. 2294; 149 A.C.WS. (3d) 157, (Sup. Ct.),
H.E. Sachs J.; Neill-Wycik Co-operative College Inc. v. Swick [2005] O.J. No. 4940; (2005] O.T.C. 996; 38
R.P.R. (4th) 229; 2005 CarswellOnt 6687, (Sup. Ct.), T. Ducharme J.; Forest City Housing Co-operative
Inc. v. Chourbagi [2005] O.J. No. 707; [2005] O.T.C. 141; 137 A.C.WS. (3d) 642, (Sup. Ct.), WA. Jenkins
J.; Robert Cooke Co-operative Homes Inc. v. Leo-Mensah [2005] O.J. No. 6264; 154 A.C.WS. (3d) 1227,
(Sup. Ct.), T.P. Herman J.; Robert Cooke Co-operative Homes Inc. v. Leo-Mensah [2005] O.J. No. 6264;
154 A.C.WS. (3d) 1227, (Sup. Ct.), T.P. Herman J.; Harmony Haven Housing Co-operative Inc. v. Per-
rotta [2003] O.J. No. 6251, (Sup. Ct.), R.G.S. Del Frate J.
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was determining the applicant's claim and was not reviewing a decision of the board. Under
these circumstances I am of the view that the court is in the same position with regard to
residents in the co-operative housing project as the court is with regard to privately owned
projects. The court must determine whether the grounds for eviction have been established.
Since Molloy J. found that the grounds for termination and eviction had not been estab-
lished, her decision terminating and evicting cannot stand. [Emphasis added.] 
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Arulappah: Court of Appeal
The only housing co-op eviction case upon which the Ontario Court of Appeal has
ruled since McBride is Tamil Co-operative Homes Inc. v. Arulappah.58 Unfortunately,
the court ruled that the case was moot, as a settlement had been reached prior to
the Divisional Court decision. However at paragraph 34 Justice Doherty, for court,
wrote, in obiter, that:
Section 171.13(12) does not articulate a standard of review. The determination of the opera-
tive standard of review is as much an exercise in judicial self-discipline as it is an exercise
in statutory interpretation. As Campbell J. observed in Ryegate (Tecumseh) Co-operative
Homes Inc. v. Stallard, supra, [2000] O.J. No. 5423. at para. 36, the standard of review will
vary depending upon the issues raised. It is impossible, in my view, to hold that s. 171.13(12)
of the Act creates a single standard of review applicable to each and every challenge made to
a Board of Director's decision to terminate membership and occupancy rights.
The Court of Appeal's suggestion, in obiter, that there is no one standard of review of
housing co-op eviction decisions unfortunately gives little guidance on what factors
would determine whether and how much the courts should defer to the co-op's evic-
tion decision in any given case.
Despite the Court of Appeal's suggesting a flexible standard of review, it appears that
Justice Molloy's interpretation that the CCA amendment did not substantively alter
the common law obligation to defer to the "social club" has been gaining ground in
the past several years.
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Comparison to Residential Tenancies Act
Under the RTA, security of tenure in government-owned subsidized housing or
subsidized housing owned by non-profit corporations is virtually identical to that
enjoyed by tenants who rent from landlords in the for-profit private sector. The law
does not distinguish security of tenure rights except that tenants living in subsidized
57. Supra note 35, para. 14.
58. Supra note 6.
59. For example Courtland Mews Co-operative Homes Inc. v. McKay [2007] O.J. No. 360; 154 A.C.WS. (3d)
973, (Sup. Ct.), D.M. Brown J.; Ujamaa Housing Co-operative Inc. v. McKenzie [2007] O.J. No. 3219; 160
A.C.WS. (3d) 83, (Sup. Ct.), D.M. Brown J.; Courtland Mews Co-operative Homes Inc. v. Smith [2007]
O.J. No. 1397; 156 A.C.WS. (3d) 940, (Sup. Ct.), D.M. Brown J.; Windward Co-operative Homes Inc.
v. Shuster [2007] O.J. No. 967; 222 O.A.C. 311; 54 R.P.R. (4th) 55; 155 A.C.WS. (3d) 1236; 2007 Car-
swellBC 1549, (Div. Ct.), G.D. Lane, P.T. Matlow & K.E. Swinton JJ.
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housing are required to disclose financial information, and have low incomes, in
order to remain entitled to a rent subsidy.
60
Eviction applications for virtually all residential housing, except co-ops, were moved
from the courts to the Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal (now the LTA) in 1998.
There is no deference towards landlords at the LTA. All landlords, including gov-
ernment-subsidized non-profit corporations with democratically elected volunteer
boards of directors, must prove the tenant to be in breach of the law before the LTB
has jurisdiction to evict the tenant.
61
AN ANALYSIS OF THE THEORY OF DEFERENCE
Housing Co-ops as "Social Club" or "Government-Funded Social-Service Providers"
Justice Molloy's analysis, and that in McBride,62 that a co-op should be given signifi-
cant deference when its board decides to evict a resident, is no longer apt. In 2009,
co-ops are not "co-operatively-owned social clubs"-they are in large part subcon-
tracted providers of government social services. No other social service providers,
including the government, are granted deference when they decide to discontinue
benefits. A housing co-op should be required to prove a substantive case on balance
of probabilities, like any other litigant, that its respondent is not longer entitled to
social housing benefits.
In 1992, when McBride was decided, the common law respecting member-owned
"social clubs" largely entitled private golf and men's clubs to restrict membership
however they wished, on the grounds that social clubs were in effect an extension of
one's own private property-and that one could exclude anyone from one's private
club, just as one could exclude anyone from one's living room.63 We have evolved
from this position. Men can no longer exclude women from their clubs in Ontario.
The consequences of eviction from any form of social housing are profound. Ontario's
Social Housing Reform Act provides that any tenant who receives subsidized housing
from which he or she is then evicted will effectively be placed on a blacklist and
barred from ever moving into any other subsidized housing.
64
60. RTA, s. 7 and SHRA, O.Reg.298/01 s. 21.
61. The LTB does not, however, have jurisdiction under the RTA to reverse a decision to remove a subsidy
pursuant to the SHRA.
62. Supra note 32.
63. Although the Ontario Human Rights Code existed, courts of the day were not very vigilant in applying
the Code.
64. Supra note 10.
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Liberal Construction of Remedial Legislation
To offer deference to one litigant necessarily tilts the playing field against its oppon-
ent. In co-op evictions, the issue is whether a government-mandated and subsidized
social service-subsidized housing provided pursuant to various statutes65 -is to be
terminated. The general principle of statutory interpretation in cases of withdrawal
of such social services was established in the leading case of Abrahams v. Canada
(Attorney General),66 and was well articulated by Chief Justice McMurtry (as he then
was) in Gray v. Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program):67
As remedial legislation, the [Ontario Disability Support Program Act] should be interpreted
broadly and liberally and in accordance with its purpose of providing support to persons
with disabilities. Section 10 of the Interpretation Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 1.11 provides:
10. Every Act shall be deemed to be remedial ... and shall accordingly receive such fair,
large and liberal construction and interpretation as will best ensure the attainment of
the object of the Act according to its true intent, meaning and spirit.
68
In Gray, the court adopted the court's reasoning from Wedekind v. Ontario (Ministry
of Community and Social Services),69 that "the principle of construction ... applicable
to social welfare legislation ... is, where there is ambiguity in the meaning of a statute,
the ambiguity should be resolved in favour of the applicant seeking benefits under
the legislation' It also relied upon the reasoning of the Federal Court of Appeal in
Villani v. Canada (Attorney General): "The liberal approach to remedial legislation
flows from the notion that such legislation has a benevolent purpose which courts
should be careful to respect'
70
To tilt the playing field in favour of the social-service-provider housing co-op, against
the rights of the recipient, is contrary to basic principles of fairness. It also reads into
the statute something that clearly is not there. As such, it would seem inappropriate
to undermine the plain words of s. 171 of the CCA by adding a common law "deemed
deference': There is no reason to relieve the housing co-op social-service provider
of its onus, as applicant, of proving that the resident clearly did contravene a by-law,
that the proper procedure was followed, and that in all of the circumstances termina-
tion of subsidized housing would not be unfair.
65. CCA, SHRA, National Housing Act, CMHC Act, supra note 15.
66. [1983] 1 S.C.R. 2.
67. Gray v. Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program) [2002] O.J. No. 1531; 59 O.R. (3d) 364; 212
D.L.R. (4th) 353; 158 O.A.C. 244; 44 Admin. L.R. (3d) 88; 113 A.C.WS. (3d) 355 (Ont. C.A.) McMurtry
C.J.O., Catzman & Gillese JJ.A.
68. The Interpretation Act has been replaced by the Legislation Act, S.O. 2006 c. 21, Schedule F.
69. (1994), 21 O.R. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.) at 296-97.
70. (2001), 205 D.L.R. (4th) 58 (F.C.A.) at 70.
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Deference to Co-operative Landlord as "Participatory Democracy"
There is no legal precedent for the proposition that courts must defer to corpor-
ate litigants, including non-profit corporations, by not requiring them as litigants to
fully meet the onus of proving their case simply because the applicant corporation is
directed by a board of directors who have been democratically elected-as corporate
boards generally are by their shareholders, and non-profit corporation boards are by
their members. Moreover, although a citizen has the right to vote for, or be elected to,
government, there is no suggestion that the court must give deference to the govern-
ment in litigation with its citizens. Deference is not given to the eviction decisions of
other social housing providers under residential tenancy legislation in Ontario,71 and
there is no reason that similar housing providers under the CCA should be accorded
great deference by the courts. The collective operation of a housing complex does
not mean that the residents should be at constant risk of losing their family's homes
if they happen to momentarily lose popularity with a majority of neighbours-any
more so than other residents.
Standard of Review Based upon "Reasonableness" Rather Than "Correctness":
Administrative Law Principles
It is perhaps unfortunate that impartial adjudicative administrative law entities may
be called "boards", just as boards of directors of corporations are called "boards". One
is, of course, very different from the other. Impartial adjudicative boards are entitled
to deference if a party to litigation decided by these boards seeks to have the deci-
sion judicially reviewed-just as appellate courts defer to trial courts. In such cases
the board itself rarely becomes the applicant at court. It is the parties to the board's
decision who are generally the litigants. Boards of corporate litigants are not entitled
to deference.
Boards in co-op eviction cases are not impartial adjudicative boards. Rather, their
corporations are the applicants. Their corporations are suing the respondent resi-
dents. These cases are not judicial reviews of decisions of an impartial adjudicative
board, and as such any suggestion that they are owed deference under administrative
law principles is misplaced. They are simply party litigants who have commenced
litigation and should have to prove their case like any other litigant-including non-
profit subsidized housing providers under the RTA and, for that matter, government-
owned subsidized housing providers-both of whom, like housing co-ops, generally
provide a right to appeal to their volunteer boards where staff decide to evict a resi-
dent. 72 In each case the LTB would give no deference to the board of the non-profit
71. In fact, under s. 83(2) of the RTA, the trier of fact is, since 2006, expressly required to make a finding
about the fairness, in all the circumstances, of evicting the tenant.
72. Louise Stevens supra note 17. For example, the government-owned London & Middlesex Housing
Corporation has an Admissions and Evictions Review Committee of its Board of Directors to whom
such appeals may be made.
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landlord should it commence an eviction application-just as it does not give defer-
ence to any landlord or tenant litigant.
Board and Members' Meetings as "Equivalent to Trials":
One rationale advanced in the context of co-operative eviction cases, for limiting the
procedural protections that courts have traditionally employed to get to the truth
(such as cross-examination) is that the resident at a housing co-op has other equiva-
lent protections. In Arulappah Justice Molloy held that:
Members of co-operatives have many protections and privileges that regular residents do
not. There is a hearing process before the Board (with a right of appeal to the membership)
before a member's rights can be terminated. There is also a democratic process for removal
of a board of directors in whom the membership has no confidence.
73
Despite Justice Molloy's dictum, the reality is that these meetings are in no sense
hearings. At best, co-op board and member meetings could be compared to town
hall-style settlement meetings. These meetings are particularly ill-suited to get to the
bottom of disputed facts, especially, as is often the case, where credibility is in issue.
Members meetings tend to be factional, personal, and raucous, and emotions often
run high. Inevitably some neighbours do not get along with some other neighbours.
The member/residents are laypersons to whom it is difficult to explain the law, much
less to make submissions about the unreliability of allegations.
The co-op board controls its process, as both prosecutor and judge and typically
asserts that it would be disloyal for the members not to support the co-op board's
decision. There is no opportunity to lead sworn evidence or test credibility.74 These
meetings are often characterized by the most troubling qualities of unchecked pure
democracy and in no sense are similar to a trial in the ability to determine the com-
plete and accurate facts-much less to determine how the law applies to those facts.
The court hearing constitutes the first realistic opportunity for a co-op resident to
lead evidence and test credibility-before an experienced trier of fact and law. If, as
is generally the case, the facts are disputed, cross-examination is imperative to get to
the truth, particularly where the real reason for the eviction is not apparent.75
73. Arulappah, supra note 43, para. 59.
74. The author has attended many of these board and members' meetings and recalls one such meeting in
which the board voted to fire their own lawyer mid-meeting when he tried to explain that they were
bound by the law, and another where the board's lawyer ruled that counsel was not permitted to make
submissions to the members-but rather the client, who did not speak English, was required to make
them. Also see St. Charles Co-operative Homes Inc. v. Henney [2008] O.J. No. 978; 165 A.C.WS. (sd) 940
(Sup. Ct.) Matheson J.: "I find the Board of Directors presented an unfair and biased impression of the
situation to the full membership. This was done to the detriment of Ms. Henney. The membership was
acting with improper and slanted evidence."
75. See Westmount Community Housing Co-operative Inc. v. Krajc-Cuprak [2002] Action No. 32301, Lon-
don, (Sup. Ct.), E. Brown J. The co-operative alleged nine breaches of its by-laws by a former board
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The Problem with Deference
There is no concept of "deference" to any other landlord or government-funded social
service provider under Ontario law. From the standpoint of the individual resident,
subsidized occupancy in a housing co-op is substantially similar to tenancy in other
government-subsidized non-profit housing. The co-op's "participatory democracy"
does not warrant the court's deferring to unfair or otherwise unlawful eviction any
more than it would defer, for example, to an arbitrary or unfair "democratic" decision
to expropriate private property. Just as the RTA provides that the trier of fact should
look at the "real substance" of matters under consideration,76 the courts should do so
too, as they had previously done under the since repealed Part IV of the LTA. 77
The fact that a housing co-op is managed by a board of directors who reside at the
co-op will not ensure fair-minded decisions. The CCA amendments were designed
to protect residents' homes when the utopian ideal of communal living occasionally
crashes into the more base reality that sometimes human behaviour falls short of the
ideal. Sometimes the very closeness of the relationship of neighbours holding the
power to evict neighbours, or contending for control of that power, may exacerbate
personal conflict-and bring out the most petty and vindictive qualities of pure dem-
ocracy. Terminating tenancy by popular vote of neighbours (the "members' meeting")
can occasionally be, in essence, a "thumbs up, thumbs down" "unpopularity contest'"
dominated by inflamed tempers and the rhetoric of intolerance-a far cry from the
sober, reasoned respect for law and the search for the truth, found at court.78
The issue of deference is particularly troubling where the "mischiefs of faction" may
be at play, that is, where, beyond the ostensible reason for eviction, the real reason for
the eviction may be retaliation, discrimination or simple mean-spiritedness. This is
sometimes seen, in the context of co-operatives, where the resident is facing eviction
based on alleged misconduct or for arrears resulting from suspension of subsidy, and
the resident happens to be a former board member or long-term resident who has
dared to challenge some action of the co-op board.79
It may also be seen where the resident is in some way an "outsider', such as a physic-
ally or developmentally disabled resident, a single mother with many children, an
member who suspected serious financial irregularities by the current board. Without the five days of
trial and extensive cross-examination of the board members, the court would not have been able to
determine that the eviction was groundless and retaliatory-and the tenant would not have been able
to subsequently get proof that the irregularities were real-which led to the board being replaced. The
result would have been very different if the hearing evidence had been limited to affidavits.
76. RTA, s. 202.
77. LTA, s.188.
78. Co-operative D'Habitation Lafontaine Inc. v. Menard [2003] O.. 253; [2003] O.T.C. 57; 119 A.C.WS.
(3d) 1031 (Sup. Ct.), Charbonneau J., at para. 30; La Paz Co-operative Homes Inc. v. Jackson [1996] O.J.
1181; 62 A.C.WS. (3d) 370, Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.), Somers J. at para. 84.
79. Westmount Community Housing Co-operative Inc. v. Krajc-Cuprak, supra note 75.
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immigrant or other residents found in some way to be different, eccentric, irritating
or unpopular.80 To paraphrase President Madison,8 1 in a democratic co-operative
there is nothing to check the inducement of the majority, here represented by its
duly elected co-op board, to sacrifice the weaker party, in this case the dissenting or
"unpopular" resident. The 1992 amendments to the CCA apparently represented the
legislature's creation of a "check" on such boards in the form of statutory protection
from arbitrary eviction and meaningful oversight of board eviction decisions by the
courts.
The purpose of the CCA is to provide a check upon those few boards who would
abuse their power, by unfairly evicting a resident. In those cases residents who chal-
lenge those boards have only the law and the courts to protect them from arbitrary or
retaliatory eviction. Human nature being what it is, some lay boards react strongly to
any perceived challenge to their authority. The fact that the resident has the right to
challenge the board's decision to that same board and to appeal to the members who
have elected that board offers no real protection. Absent the protection of the courts,
bona fide dissent by individual subsidized residents may become hazardous-and
chill healthy democracy.
TREND TOWARDS Loss OF ORAL HEARINGS / SUBSTANTIAL INDEMNITY
COSTS / REFUSAL TO RESTORE UNLAWFULLY TERMINATED RENT SUBSIDY
Housing co-op eviction applications are probably among the smallest cases, in finan-
cial terms, that judges of the Superior Court still hear-and they see them only rarely.
The collective memory of the court for the "quick and basic" oral hearings for evic-
tion applications pursuant to the LTA, which the courts routinely heard until 1998,
appears to have faded following the removal of those applications to the OHRT. They
were summary proceedings similar to Small Claims Court trials. Co-op eviction ap-
plications used to generally be modelled on these "quick and basic" oral hearings.
Today, eviction hearings at the LTB remain quick and basic. Paperwork is kept to
a minimum. Hearings are based upon oral evidence and usually do not exceed
one hour in length. Landlords are represented generally by inexpensive paralegals.
Community legal-aid clinics are still active in defending tenants-which, because
these procedures are so simple, legal-aid clinics can still manage despite increasingly
limited resources.
As memory of the "quick and basic" eviction hearing has faded, the courts have ap-
parently looked elsewhere, such as the practice for applications commenced pursu-
ant to Rule 38 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rule 72 simplified trial rules, for
80. Forest City Housing Co-operative Inc. v. Chourbagi [2005] O.J. No. 707; (2005] O.T.C. 141; 137 A.C.WS.
(3d) 642, (Sup. Ct.), W.A. Jenkins J.
81. Supranote8.
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guidance in determining how applications commenced pursuant to s. 171 of the CCA
should be held.
Non-profit housing co-ops, impoverished residents receiving subsidized housing and
community legal-aid clinics cannot afford to litigate housing co-op eviction cases
where courts now require the filing of extensive pleadings, including comprehensive
affidavit evidence and the delivery of factums.
Loss of Oral Evidence and Cross-examination
The increase in "deference" has led some courts to hold that, since the hearing is not
a full review of whether the resident has breached a by-law, there is no need for oral
evidence and cross-examination 82-notwithstanding the fact that virtually every
reported housing co-op eviction case (in which the reasons disclose whether oral or
affidavit evidence was led) until 2003 proceeded with oral evidence, and some still
do.83 One may wonder how a court can exercise its "relief from eviction where unfair
to evict" mandate as required by s. 171.21 (1)(a) of the CCA if it does not assess the
parties' demeanour and credibility, and how it can do so in a meaningful way if it has
only affidavits.
Traditionally applications under the CCA have been commenced by the housing co-
op filing an affidavit. This practice is carried over from s. 74 of Part III of the LTA,84
which governed housing co-op evictions until 1992. It provided that "the tenant's
landlord may apply upon affidavit to a judge of the Superior Court of Justice to make
the inquiry" 85 and "if the tenant appears, the judge shall, in a summary manner, hear
the parties and their witnesses, and examine into the matter, and, if it appears to the
82. These cases do not refer to the practice prior to 2003-except Cordova, which dismisses it as "Toronto
practice". A trend in many of these cases is that the resident is unrepresented and the case law that is
contrary to the co-operatives interests is not referred to. Ujamaa Housing Co-operative Inc. v. McKenzie
[2007] O.J. No. 4131, (Sup. Ct.), D.M. Brown J. (require "responding record"); Phoenix Housing Co-
operative Inc. v. Amaral [2006] O.J. No. 4714; 153 A.C.W.S. (3d) 229, (Sup. Ct.), P.B. Hockin J.; Lake-
shore Gardens Co-operative Homes Inc. v. Bhikram [2006] O.J. No. 2941; 148 A.C.WS. (3d) 523, (Div.
Ct.), E.M. Macdonald, G.J. Epstein & D.R. Cameron JJ.; Three Streets Housing Co-operative Inc. v. Mizzi
[2005] Ct. file no. 05-CV-288877 (Sup. Ct.), Day J.; Cordova Co-operative Homes v. Duval [2005], Ct.
file no. 27732/03 (Sup. Ct.) Timms J. In Alexandra Park Co-operative v. Hamilton [2009] 0.. No. 2768,
Code J., the resident's lawyer was all but accused of malpractice for asking the court to use the pre-2003
practice. This may further "chill" the defence of these residents.
83. For example Courtland Mews Co-operative Homes Inc. v. McKay [2007] 0.1. No. 360; 154 A.C.WS. (3d)
973, (Sup. Ct.), D.M. Brown J. (open to oral evidence); Agincourt Co-operative Homes Inc. v. Edwards
[2006] O.J. No. 2294; 149 A.C.WS. (3d) 157, (Sup. Ct.), H.E. Sachs J.; Woodsworth Housing Co-op v.
Tarling [2006] O.J. No. 624; [2006] O.T.C. 161; 145 A.C.WS. (3d) 980, (Sup. Ct.), R.E. Mesbur J. (cross-
examination); Forest City Housing Co-operative Inc. v. Chourbagi [2005] O.J. No. 707; [2005] O.T.C.
141; 137 A.C.WS. (3d) 642, (Sup. Ct.), WA. Jenkins J. (oral evidence).
84. Now the Commercial Tenancies Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.7.
85. Ibid. s. 74.
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judge that the tenant wrongfully holds against the right of the landlord, he or she may
order the issue of the writ" [emphasis added].86
It seems perhaps an anachronism that these applications are commenced by filing
an affidavit but proceed based on oral evidence. There is no requirement for the
respondent housing co-op resident to file any pleadings. The CCA requires only that
"the respondent may dispute the applicant's claim by attending on the return of the
application.'
It now appears that some courts, perhaps not knowing this procedural history, have
assumed that, since the application is commenced with an affidavit, only affidavit
evidence should be permitted and that, since factums are required for other types
of applications under the Rules of Civil Procedure, the same procedure must also
apply under the CCA. Despite that comparison, the same procedure does not apply.
Paperwork for residential eviction cases had always been kept to a minimum, as
continues to be the case under the present RTA. This recent significant increase in
paperwork has increased the cost of litigating these cases significantly. Fortunately,
some courts continue to permit oral evidence.
88
SUBSTANTIAL INDEMNITY OR SUBSTANTIALLY DISPROPORTIONATE COSTS
Deference has led some courts to unquestioningly order substantial indemnity costs
89
against housing co-op residents,90 sometimes far beyond the financial amounts in
issue.9 1 Housing co-ops routinely claim these costs where permitted by the co-op by-
laws. Some courts, although rejecting substantial indemnity costs, still award partial
indemnity costs that are far beyond the a low-income housing co-op residents abil-
86. Ibid. s. 76(2).
87. CCA s. 171.13(6).
88. See for example Kenfinch Co-operative Housing Inc. v. Obermuller [2008] O.J. No. 186; 163 A.C.WS.
(3d) 344, (Sup. Ct.) Forestell J.; Cornerstone Co-operative Homes Inc. v. Spilchuk [2004] O.J. No. 3219,
(Sup. Ct.), Quinn J., and Lakeshore Village Artist's Co-operative Inc. v. Leger [2004] O.J. No. 6180, (Sup.
Ct.), Himel J.
89. "Solicitor-client costs are generally awarded only where there has been reprehensible, scandalous or
outrageous conduct on the part of one of the parties.' Young v. Young [1993] S.C.J. No. 112; [1993] 4
S.C.R. 3, McLachlin, CJC.
90. Becker v. City Park Co-operative Apartments Inc. [2006] O.J. No. 2685, (Div. Ct.), G.J. Epstein J.; Bel-
lamy Housing Co-op Inc. v. Koroma [2006] Ct. file no. 06-CV-309144 Toronto, (Sup. Ct.), Somers J.;
Cornerstone Co-operative Homes Inc. v. Spilchuk [2004] O.J. No. 3219; [2004] O.T.C. 677; 132 A.C.WS.
(3d) 804, (Sup. Ct.), J.W Quinn J.; David B. Archer Co-operative Inc. v. D'Oliveira [2003] O.J. No. 1469;
171 O.A.C. 45; 28 R.P.R. (4th) 258; 122 A.C.WS. (3d) 385, (Div. Ct.), A. Campbell, McNeely & E.M.
Macdonald JJ.
91. "Costs must be commensurate with the value of the lawsuit to the parties", Amherst Crane Rentals Ltd.
v. Perring (2004), 241 D.L.R. (4th) 176, 187 O.A.C. 336 (C.A.) (leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada denied [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 430.
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ity to pay. For example, in Ujamaa Housing Co-operative Inc., costs of $22,000 were
awarded-equal to several years of the residents' social benefits. 92
Other cases, such as Cornerstone v. Spilchuk,93 have recently been followed by other
courts as authority for awarding substantial indemnity costs.94 In Cornerstone, the
housing co-op residents were unrepresented. The judge referred to no case authority,
much less distinguishing any of the rationale for traditional co-op awards of modest
costs, in his decision. There is no evidence he was referred to it. The learned judge's
award of costs against the elderly pensioner resident couple of $50,000 (because the
pensioners were inefficient in presenting their defence) is equal to several years of
their pension income. The costs award would apparently bar them from subsidized
housing for life, as they would not be re-eligible until the costs were paid in full.95
Other courts have, however, awarded costs consistent with a Small Claims Court and
LTB scale of $750 or less.96 To award costs on a substantial indemnity scale simply
because the by-law permits this ignores the court's discretion to award appropriate
and reasonable costs. In Ibrahim v. Kadhim, for example, the court limited costs on
the basis that:
There must be practical and reasonable limits to the amount awarded for costs and those
amounts should bear some reasonable connection to the amount that should reasonably
have been contemplated ... The objective of a costs order is to fix an amount that is fair and
reasonable for the unsuccessful party to pay in the particular proceeding, rather than an
amount fixed by the actual costs incurred by the successful party.
97
The LTB continues the courts' pre-1998 practice of holding summary eviction hear-
ings with oral evidence and very little paperwork. The maximum costs award at the
LTB, which is rarely granted, is approximately $500. At Small Claims Court, which
92. Ujamaa Housing Co-operative Inc. v. McKenzie [2007] O.1. No. 4131, (Sup. Ct.), D.M. Brown J.; Court-
land Mews Co-operative Homes Inc. v. Smith [2007] O.J. No. 2128; 157 A.C.W.S. (3d) 919, (Sup. Ct.),
D.M. Brown J.; John Bruce Village Co-operative v. Goulding [2007] O.. No. 2236; 158 A.C.WS. (3d) 19;
158 A.C.WS. (3d) 204, (Sup. Ct.), E.P. Belobaba J.; Niagara Neighbourhood Housing Co-operative Inc. v.
Edward [2006] O.J. No. 2924, (Div. Ct.) G.J. Epstein J.
93. Cornerstone Co-operative Homes Inc. v. Spilchuk [2004] O.J. No. 4049; 72 O.R. (3d) 103; [2004] O.T.C.
853; 7 C.PC. (6th) 383; 134 A.C.W.S. (3d) 438, (Sup. Ct.), J.W Quinn J.
94. Supra note 89.
95. Supra note 64.
96. Courtland Mews Co-operative Homes Inc. v. Romero [2005] O.J. No. 4326; [2005] O.T.C. 890; 142
A.C.WS. (3d) 1065, (Sup. Ct.), T. Ducharme J.; Windward Co-operative Homes Inc. v. Shuster [2005]
O.J. No. 5329; [2005] O.T.C. 1007; 39 R.PR. (4th) 325; 144 A.C.WS. (3d) 417; 2005 CarswellOnt 7175,
(Sup. Ct.), H.J. Wilton-Siegel J.; Tamil Co-operative Homes Inc. v. Kandiah [2005] O.. No. 1757; 138
A.C.WS. (3d) 1023 (Div. Ct.), J.D. Cunningham A.C.J.S.C.J., G.D. Lane & R.WM. Pitt, JJ.; Eagleson Co-
operative Homes Inc. v. Theberge [2005] O.J. No. 73; 136 A.C.WS. (3d) 380, (Sup. Ct.), M.Z. Charbon-
neau J.; David B. Archer Co-operative Inc. v. Van Sickle [2002] O.1. No. 3088; [2002] O.T.C. 564, (Sup.
Ct.), McWatt J.; Cordova Co-operative Homes v. Carder [2000] O.J. No. 3803, (Div. Ct.), Hartt, Southey
& McFarland JI.
97. Ibrahim v. Kadhim (2007) 86 O.R. (3d) 728, (Sup. Ct.), Tulloch J., at para. 8.
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has a limit of 15 per cent of the amount claimed,98 cost awards rarely exceed $500.
Costs award of this magnitude would recognize that in order to qualify for subsid-
ized housing the tenant must already be quite poor.99 Yet exorbitant cost awards are
becoming all too common in housing co-op evictions. The risk of such large awards
strongly deters low-income residents from defending themselves in court against
eviction.
Unlawful Termination of Rent Subsidy
Some courts have in recent years held that if a housing co-op unlawfully terminates
a residents rent subsidy (pursuant to the SHRA), the court cannot intervene. The
resident is evicted for rent arrears. 100 Many other courts, however, have restored the
residents subsidy-thus eliminating the "arrears" and refusing eviction.10 1 This is a
common tactic of boards who may not be acting in good faith. This may been seen, for
example, where a housing co-op does not generally insist upon strict compliance with
deadlines for verification of income but decides to with one unpopular resident.
CONCLUSION
The concept of deference to subsidized non-profit housing co-ops is a creature of
common law rooted in factual assumptions and resultant rationales that are outdated
and not applicable to modern government-subsidized housing co-ops. These are not
98. CIA, s. 29.
99. "[T]he Board does not want to use its power to award costs in a way which would discourage landlords
and tenants from exercising their statutory rights ... In most cases, the only costs allowed will be the
application fee [$150.00] ... A Member has the discretion to require a party to pay, as costs, any repre-
sentation or preparation expenses of another party where the conduct of the party was unreasonable.
Conduct is unreasonable if it causes undue expense or delay ... the amount allowed in total for the
proceedings cannot exceed $500, including any amount ordered for the hearing": RTA, s. 204; Landlord
and Tenant Board Rules of Practice r. 27; LTB Interpretation Guideline 3 "Costs", Ontario Landlord and
Tenant Law Practice, 2007, Fleming J., Lexis/Nexis, pp. 475 and 513; "An award of costs in the Small
Claims Court, other than disbursements, shall not exceed 15 per cent of the amount claimed": Rules of
the SCC O.Reg. 258/98, r. 19; C]A R.S.O. 1990 c. 43, s. 29.
100. Tamil Co-operative Homes Inc. v. Kandiah [2005] O.J. No. 460; 137 A.C.WS. (3d) 210, (Div. Ct.). J.D.
Cunningham A.C.J.S.C.J., G.D. Lane & R.W.M. Pitt JJ. (no reasons given); Woburn Village Co-operative
Homes Inc. v. Buck [2001] O.J. No. 1728; [2001] O.T.C. 341; 105 A.C.WS. (3d) 153, (Sup. Ct.), Dunnet
J.
101. Courtland Mews Co-operative Homes Inc. v. McKay [2007] O.J. No. 360; 154 A.C.WS. (3d) 973, (Sup.
Ct.), D.M. Brown J.; Agincourt Co-operative Homes Inc. v. Edwards [2006] O.J. No. 2294; 149 A.C.WS.
(3d) 157, (Sup. Ct.), H.E. Sachs J.; Forest City Housing Co-operative Inc. v. Chourbagi [2005] O.J. No.
707; [2005] O.T.C. 141; 137 A.C.WS. (3d) 642, (Sup. Ct.), WA. Jenkins J.; Phoenix Housing Co-opera-
tive Inc. v. Viner [2004] O.J. No. 1476; 130 A.C.WS. (3d) 172, (Sup. Ct.), Rady J.; Ann Marie Hill Hous-
ing Co-operative Inc. v. Boahemaa [2002] O.J. No. 3490; [2002] O.T.C. 657; 116 A.C.WS. (3d) 597, (Sup.
Ct.), Pitt J.; Tolpuddle Housing Co-operative Inc. v. Smieja [2002] O.J. No. 1476, (Sup. Ct.), W. Jenkins
J.
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private social clubs, but rather are contracted government-funded social service
providers.
There is still a line of cases, although that they are fast becoming the exception, that
protect security of tenure on the basis of plain words of the CCA, where oral hearings
are still held, where costs remain within a range that is not ruinous to the low-income
resident, where courts refuse to evict where the housing co-op does not prove its case
upon admissible evidence or where the circumstances warrant relief from eviction
despite grounds for eviction existing.
The recent trend evidences an enormous judge-made discrepancy between the secur-
ity of tenure rights enjoyed by residents who happen to be offered accommodation in
subsidized non-profit housing corporations versus residents offered accommodation
in subsidized non-profit housing co-ops. It may be that the only hope of remedying
this apparent imbalance at this point is an appellate ruling on sympathetic facts after
a thorough argument and analysis of the law and the legislative history of the non-
profit housing co-op legislation.
Perhaps the simplest solution is for the CCA to be amended so that these matters
are moved from the courts to the LTB, like most other residential eviction applica-
tions were in 1998.102 It would be unfortunate if the court lost this last connection
with Ontarians of modest means. However, this alone may not be enough, unless the
legislature also signalled that the transition was intended to remedy the judge-made
imbalance.
Laws and courts exist to regulate behaviour, where necessary, in those rare cases where
people are perhaps not at their best. It is fine to respect co-operative boards and to
recognize that they generally behave fairly towards their residents. But good manage-
ment by most should not give a free pass for substantive unfairness to the few hous-
ing co-ops that would unfairly evict a resident of modest means from government-
subsidized home notwithstanding that he or she or has contravened no law or by-law.
It is here that the courts' processes for getting to the truth, such as hearing admissible
oral evidence and cross-examination, are most needed. Families facing the loss of gov-
ernment-funded subsidized housing need their security of tenure protected-perhaps
more than most residents, as they cannot afford market-cost housing.
When a co-operative board fairly wishes to evict a resident family, there is no need
for the court to offer it deference. It can prove its case just like any other applicant.
Neither should courts defer if a board unfairly attempts to evict someone, or if the
true facts weigh against eviction for other reasons. The courts should instead "check"
the unfairness, and protect these families' homes.
102. The government is considering this. Moving Forward on Co-operative Housing Tenure Disputes Reso-
lution, Consultation Paper, Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, August 2009 (as en-
dorsed by the Co-operative Housing Federation of Canada by Resolution of Ontario Region at its 2009
AGM).

